Switching Costs and promising the impossible

“Many consumers remain loyal due simply to the absence of a negative because it is often easier to put up with something that is less than perfect than go to the trouble, and potential expense, of switching”

PricewaterhouseCoopers summed up their findings above in July regarding cell phone and pay TV customer loyalty. In the midst of swirling hysteria over cable TV “cord-cutting”, their survey restated the power of inertia and loss aversion.

In the hysteria that is the US presidential elections, Jon Stewart showcased the FDR video clip recently on The Daily Show. It was used to underline the current predilection Governor Romney has for stating he can not only improve the financial and military strength of the country, but do so at no extra cost to the taxpayer. This has met with puzzlement in the press. Romney has yet to fully describe how he plans to do both these things at once. It smacks of promising the impossible (not that Obama has been much more candid in his own policy details).

In politics, as with brands. If you are asking someone to change their allegiance from one thing to another, said person must consider whether the pros of changing affiliation outweigh the cons. If a brand or political party wants to be that change, they must convince the buyer – or voter – that the switching costs are low enough for it to be worth their while.

This can lead to overpromising, which in marketing can lead to a disappointed buyer and post-purchase dissonance. (Sadly it is less easy to return your ballot and ask to vote again). The ebullience of the sell can ultimately damage the brand. That is why marketers must strive to be honest with the consumer. If long-term commitment to a product or service is what is being sought, hyperbole or a disengenuous call to action can permanently damage a brand’s equity. You just have to think about what makes your product or service truly stand apart from its peers. If this is too much to ask, then its to time to rethink your offering.